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Food and agricultural commodity value chains in developing and transition countries 
have undergone tremendous changes in the past decades. Companies and property 
rights have been privatized, markets liberalized, and economies integrated into global 
food systems. The liberalization and privatization initially caused the collapse of 
state-controlled vertical integration. More recently, private vertical coordination 
systems have emerged and are growing rapidly as a response to consumer demand for 
food quality and safety on the one hand and the farms’ production constraints caused 
by factor market imperfections.  In this paper we (a) demonstrate the importance of 
these changes, (b) discuss the implications for efficiency and equity and (c) provide 
empirical evidence on the effects in several developing and transition countries.   
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Twenty-five years ago, a vast share of the poor and middle income countries, 
covering a large share of the world’s agricultural areas and farmers, were characterized 
by state-controlled supply chains for agricultural and food commodities.  This was most 
extreme in the Communist world, spreading from Central Europe to East Asia, where 
the entire agri-food system was under strict control of the state.  However, also in many 
African, Latin-American and South Asian countries the state played a very important 
role in the agri-food chains.  For example, in Brazil and Mexico, wholesale markets 
were run by the state; in South Asia the state heavily regulated food markets and many 
African commodity markets and trade regimes were controlled by (para-)state 
organizations. In many of these countries, the state played an important  role in 
agricultural production and marketing in the decades after independence from colonial 
power. Governments in Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) and South Asia were heavily involved 
in agricultural marketing and food processing through the creation of marketing boards, 
government-controlled cooperatives and parastatal processing units. These government 
institutions were often monopoly buyers of agricultural products, especially for basic 
food crops and important export crops. 
  This system of state intervention and control has undergone tremendous 
changes in the 1980s and the 1990s as a global process of liberalization induced 
dramatic changes in many of these regions. In the transition world, the liberalization of 
prices, trade and exchanges, the privatization of the state enterprises etc. removed much 
of the state control over the commodity chains as well as the vertical coordination in the 
  2chains. Similar processes of privatization and liberalization of domestic and 
international commodity and financial markets reduced the control of the state over the 
food and agricultural chains in many developing and emerging economies. 
 
Globalization 
Globalization of the food chains in transition and developing countries has been 
driven by several factors.  Some factors are not specific to these countries, such as the 
global process of increased international trade and investment, and the structural 
changes in the global food markets. Specific factors are the liberalization of the trade 
and investment regimes in transition and developing countries – policy reforms which 
often accompanied the privatization and domestic price reforms. Here we focus on four 
factors which are of special importance.  
First, trade liberalization caused major changes in trade of agri-food products.  
For example in Central and Eastern Europe it caused a major reorientation of the agri-
food trade from “east to west”, i.e. from trade with the former Soviet countries to trade 
with western Europe, and a shift of the agri-food trade position from net exporters to 
net importers.  
Second, the liberalization of the investment regimes induced foreign 
investments in agribusiness, food industry, and further down the chain, with major 
implications for farmers (Dries and Swinnen, 2004). Several food sectors in Eastern 
Europe, such as the sugar, dairy, and retail sector, have received massive amounts of 
foreign investment, which now holds dominant market shares. An example is the rapid 
growth of modern retail chains (“supermarkets”) in transition and developing countries 
which was triggered by the reform process in former state-controlled economies 
(Reardon and Swinnen, 2004).   
  3Third, in addition to increasing trade, also the structure of this trade changed 
considerably. There has been an increase in the share of high-value products – mainly 
fish and fishery products, and fruits and vegetables – in world agricultural trade.   
Especially developing countries experienced a sharp increase in such high-value 
exports while the importance of their traditional tropical export commodities – such as 
coffee, cocoa, and tea – has decreased. 
    Fourth, associated with these changes is the spread of (private and public) 
food standards. Consumers are increasingly demanding specific quality attributes of 
processed and fresh food products and are increasingly aware of food safety issues. 
These food quality and safety demands are most pronounced in western markets (and 
increasingly in urban markets of low-income countries) and affect traders and 
producers in transition and developing countries through international trade.  
 
From Public to Private Governance 
State-controlled vertical coordination  
Vertical coordination (VC) was widespread in state-controlled food supply 
chains. Again this was most extreme in the Communist system where production at 
various stages and the exchange of inputs and outputs along the chain was coordinated 
and determined by the central command system (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004).     
However also in other regions where the state played an important role in food chains 
vertical coordination was widespread. Government marketing organizations and 
parastatal processing companies used VC systems with upstream suppliers. The 
dominant form of state-controlled VC was that of seasonal input and credit provisions 
  4to small farmers in return for supplies of primary produce.
1 In fact, state-controlled VC 
was often the only source of input and credit for peasant farmers (IFAD, 2003). 
Most analyses point at the deficiencies and inefficiencies of these systems. 
State-controlled VC in centralized agricultural marketing systems in developing and 
Communist countries was often motivated by political motives and by objectives to 
provide cheap food for urban markets, the maximization of foreign exchange earnings, 
the creation of rural employment, ascertaining the viability of certain businesses, etc. 
This is considered one of the primary causes of the inefficiency of the Soviet farming 
complex (Johnson and Brooks, 1983; Swinnen and Rozelle, 2006). Also in Africa, 
several studies conclude that state-controlled outgrower schemes were inefficient and 
poorly managed, which manifested itself, among other things, in low credit repayment 
rates (Warning and Key 2002).
2  
 
Liberalization, privatization, and the break-down of vertical coordination  
This system of vertical coordination has undergone tremendous changes in the 
1980s and the 1990s.  In the transition world, the liberalization of exchange and prices, 
and the privatization of farms and enterprises caused the collapse of vertical 
coordination and caused major disruptions in the food chain.   
The disruptions in relationships of farms with input suppliers and food 
companies also resulted in many farms facing serious constraints in accessing essential 
inputs (feed, fertilizer, seeds, capital, etc.). Also in many developing countries 
                                                 
1 For example, the government marketing boards ADMARC in Malawi and NAMBOARD in Zambia 
provided seasonal inputs to peasant farmers deducting the value of the inputs from the payment made for 
marketed output at harvest time. Also parastatal cotton companies such as CMDT in Mali, 
SODECOTON in Cameroon and the Ghana Cotton Development Board in Ghana provided credit and 
inputs to cotton farmers (Poulton et al., 1998). 
 
2 Some studies also point at successful state-controlled VC. For example, Poulton et al. (1998) argue that 
some large government outgrower schemes in Malawi were successful in achieving very high repayment 
rates. Also the outgrower schemes of the Kenyan Tea Development Authority are referred to as a success 
story, which is attributed to its extensive form of VC (Bauman, 2000). 
  5privatization and market liberalization led to the decline of input and credit supply to 
farms as it disrupted the working of various government-controlled agricultural 
institutions, cooperative unions and parastatal processing companies.
3 As government 
marketing boards and cooperatives have ceased to play a major role in the procurement 
of agricultural produce, so has the provision of credit and agricultural inputs through 
state-controlled VC. In addition, market liberalization led to the removal of price 
supports and input subsidies, a reduction in government research and extension 
services, and a decline in government (subsidized) credit to the agricultural sector. 
 
The emergence of private vertical coordination  
However, following privatization and liberalization, new forms of VC have 
emerged and are growing (Swinnen, 2006; World Bank, 2005). These are no longer 
state-controlled but are introduced by private companies. Private traders, retailers, 
agribusinesses and food processing companies increasingly contract with farms and 
rural households to whom they provide inputs and services in return for guaranteed and 
quality supplies. This process of interlinked contracts is growing rapidly in the 
transition and developing world.  
The emergence and spread of private VC is caused by the combination of, on 
the one hand, an increasing demand for products of high quality and safety standards 
with private sector investments and increasing consumer incomes and demands (both 
domestically and through trade) and, on the other hand, the problems which farms face 
to supply such products reliably, consistently and timely to processors and traders due 
to a variety of market imperfections and poor public institutions.  
                                                 
3 For example in Kenya, the economic reforms have led to the collapse of the National Cereals and 
Produce Marketing Board, the Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board, the Kenya Grain Growers 
Cooperative Union, etc.  (IFAD, 2003). 
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realizing high-quality, consistent supplies. These include financial constraints as well as 
difficulties in input markets, lack of technical and managerial capacity etc. Specifically 
for high-standards products, farmers might lack the expertise and have no access to 
crucial inputs such as improved seeds. To guarantee consistent and quality supplies, 
traders and processors engage in VC to overcome farmers’ constraints.  
The importance of VC in developing and transition countries is further 
explained by the lack of efficient institutions and infrastructure to assure consistent, 
reliable, quality and timely supply through spot market arrangements. VC is in fact a 
private institutional response to the above described market constraints. To overcome 
problems of enforcement and constraints on quality supplies, private VC systems are 
set up by processors, traders, retailers and input suppliers. 
Increasing consumer demand for quality and food safety is another driving force 
behind private VC in transition and developing countries. Investment by modern 
processors and retailers (supermarket chains) reinforces the need for supplying large 
and consistent volumes by their use of private standards and requirements of extensive 
supervision and control of production processes.    
Emerging empirical evidence suggests that these new forms of private VC can 
be an engine of economic growth, rural development and poverty reduction.  The next 
section presents evidence on its effects in transition and developing countries. 
 
The importance of private vertical coordination  
The importance of private VC is increasing in developing and transition 
countries. At the end of the 1990s, in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, 80% 
of corporate farms sold crops on contract, and 60-85% sold animal products on contract 
  7(Swinnen 2005). A survey of agri-food processors in five CIS countries found that food 
companies which used contracts with suppliers grew from slightly more than one-third 
in 1997 to almost three-quarters by 2003 (White and Gorton, 2004). There is also 
significant growth of supplier support measures – including credit, inputs, prompt 
payments, transportation, and quality control – as part of these contracts. Over 40% of 
processors in the CIS sample offer credit to at least some of the farms that supply them; 
and 36% offered inputs, in 2003.  
In developing countries private VC is emerging and growing in many sectors. 
Traditional tropical export products (coffee, tea, cocoa, rubber and oil palm) are 
increasingly grown by smallholders under contract farming arrangements, often with 
the provision of inputs, new technologies, and credit and extension services to farmers. 
For example in Kenya, half to the coffee is produced by smallholders (Baumann, 2000). 
In South and Southeast Asia, there has been a sharp increase in VC, especially in 
animal farming and dairy processing (Gulati et al., 2005). In SSA, private VC has 
become a dominant system of rural financing. For example, in Mozambique and 
Zambia it is virtually the only source of finance for agricultural households (IFAD, 
2003). Also in Latin-America, VC is widespread over many different agricultural 
commodities and includes various contractual arrangements ranging from purely 
marketing contracts to production contracts with provision of inputs, credit, technical 
assistance and marketing assistance (Dirven, 1996).  
  
Effects of Private Vertical Coordination 
The emergence of private VC is often mentioned as a new engine for economic 
growth, rural development and poverty reduction. In this section we summarize the 
  8empirical evidence on the impact of VC in transition and developing countries. We 
distinguish between efficiency effects and equity effects.  
 
Efficiency effects  
The impact of private VC systems on productivity is difficult to quantify as 
several other factors affect output simultaneously and as company level information is 
difficult to obtain. Still, the evidence suggests that successful private VC has important 
positive effects, both direct and indirect.   
The direct impact is on the output and productivity of the processing company 
that initiates vertical contracting and of its suppliers involved in VC schemes. 
Supplying farmers have experienced beneficial effects on output, productivity, and 
product quality – and ultimately on incomes – through better access to inputs, timely 
payments, and improved productivity with new investments. Case studies indicate that 
private VC programs can lead to strong growth in output, quality and productivity. For 
example, case studies of the sugar and dairy sectors in East Europe show how new 
private contracts and farm assistance programs caused output, yields, and investments 
to grow dramatically (Gow et al, 2000; Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Swinnen, 2006). A 
major IFPRI-FAO study finds that contract broiler farmers are significantly more 
efficient and produce higher profits than independent farms in the Philippines and 
Thailand (Gulati et al., 2005). Maertens and Swinnen (2006) find that the benefits from 
contract-farming in horticulture production in Senegal in terms of higher rural incomes 
are substantial. In the case of Polish dairy farms, milk quality rose rapidly following 
contract innovations by dairy processors in the mid 1990s. The share of the market held 
by highest quality milk increased from less than 30% on average in 1996 to around 
80% on average in 2001 (Dries and Swinnen, 2004). 
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risk reduces; their access to capital increases and the productivity of non-contracted 
activities increases. Next to farm assistance VC also implies guaranteed sales, often at 
guaranteed prices, which comes down to decreased marketing risk for farmers. 
Coordinating firms also share in the production risk of farmers through ex ante 
provision of inputs and credit. Moreover, credit arrangements and prompt cash 
payments after harvest in VC programs improves farmer’s cash flow and access to 
capital. Reduced risks, improved income stability and access to capital are particularly 
important effects in the case of capital and insurance market imperfections. In addition, 
contract-farming can lead to productivity spillovers on other crops, resulting from 
management advise, access to improved technologies, better input use, etc.  
A number of empirical studies provide evidence for these household spillover 
effects. For example, Gulati et al. (2005) show that there is significantly less variation 
in yields and prices during the year for contract broiler farmers in India. Henson (2004) 
shows that contracted vegetable farmers in Uganda benefit from reduced risk and 
improved access to credit. Another illustrative example comes from Minten et al. 
(2006) on the FFV sector in Madagascar. A large number of very small farms benefit 
from vegetable contract farming through more stable incomes, shorter lean periods, and 
technology and productivity spillovers on rice. There are a number of studies 
specifically examining the motivations of farmers to engage in contract-production. 
These show that guaranteed sales and prices, access to inputs and credit are the most 
important motivations rather than direct income effects (e.g. Maertens et al., 2006; 
Minten et al., 2006; Swinnen, 2005).  
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There are two potential equity issues with VC processes. The first concerns the 
distribution of rents in vertically coordinated food supply chains. The second concerns 
the participation and exclusion of smallholders and poorer farmers in contract-farming.  
Vertical coordination implies sharing risks, costs and benefits between the 
coordinating firm – mostly food processors, exporters and retail chains – and farmers / 
suppliers. By introducing an interlinked contract, farms can access credit, inputs, etc. 
which were unavailable before and processing companies can have access to higher 
quality and timely supplies. Productivity and therefore income increases for the supply 
chain as a whole.  However, a key question is who benefits from this increase in 
efficiency and total income? If the supplier and the processor benefit, both parties share 
in the gains from the institutional innovation, and everybody is better off. However, if 
the processing firm can set the terms of the contract such that it captures most or all of 
the rents, the productivity growth may not benefit the farms; and interlinking may even 
bestow additional monopoly power upon the processing company. Contract-farming 
has often been criticized as being a tool for agro-industrial firms and food 
multinationals to exploit unequal power relationships with farmers and extract rents 
from the chain (Warning and Key, 2002). However, our review of empirical evidence 
on the effects of VC presented above indicates that farmers do share importantly in the 
benefits of contract-farming and VC.  
The capacity of emerging VC in agri-food supply chains to serve as an engine 
of pro-poor economic growth critically depends on the types of farmers that are 
included in contract schemes. VC has the potential to affect the way income is 
distributed within a rural economy and can exacerbate existing patterns of economic 
stratification (Warning and Key, 2002). If agro-industrial firms prefer to contract with 
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are three important reasons why this might be so. First, transaction costs favour larger 
farms in supply chains. Second, when some amount of investment is needed in order to 
contract with or supply to the company, small farms are often more constrained in their 
financial means for making necessary investments. Third, small farms typically require 
more assistance from the company per unit of output.  
However, there are also reasons why agro-industrial firms do contract with 
smallholders and poorer farmers. First, the most straightforward reason is that 
companies have no choice.  In some cases, small farmers represent the vast majority of 
the potential supply base. Second, while processors may prefer to deal with large farms 
because of lower transaction costs in e.g. collection and administration, contract 
enforcement may be more problematic, and hence costly, with larger farms. Processors 
repeatedly emphasized that farms’ willingness to learn and a professional attitude were 
more important than size in establishing fruitful farm-processor relationships. Third, in 
some cases small farms may have substantive cost advantages. This is particularly the 
case in labour intensive, high maintenance, production activities with relatively small 
economies of scale. Fourth, processors may prefer a mix of suppliers in order not to 
become too dependent on a few large suppliers.  
Empirical observations show a very mixed picture of actual contracting, with 
much more small farms being contracted than predicted based on the arguments above. 
In fact, surveys in Poland, Romania and CIS find no evidence that small farmers have 
been excluded over the past six years in developing supply chains. In the CIS, the vast 
majority of companies have the same or more small suppliers in 2003 than in 1997 
(Swinnen, 2006; World Bank, 2005). Also for the peanut sector in Senegal, no evidence 
was found for a bias in the participation of farmers in contract-schemes towards better-
  12off households (Warning and Key, 2002). Moreover, studies on the FFV export sector 
in Madagascar by Minten et al (2006) and in Senegal by Maertens et al. (2006) find that 
there are important effects on poverty reduction from vertical coordination in high-
value supply chains.  
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